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A “MEANINGFUL” SEAT AT THE TABLE:
CONTEMPLATING OUR ONGOING
STRUGGLE TO ACCESS DEMOCRACY
James M. Binnall *
ABSTRACT
In recent years, felon-voter disenfranchisement has received considerable attention from
academics, policymakers, and the media. In turn, a number of jurisdictions have eased
record-based voter restriction statutes. And while those efforts represent a significant step
toward full civic reintegration for those with a felony criminal history, they are far from
comprehensive, as they regularly omit citizens with certain types of felony convictions and
typically address only one form of civic marginalization. Focusing on recent reform in the
area of civic restrictions, this Article suggests that incomplete civic restoration comes with
significant consequences that ought to be considered during legislative negotiations. This
Article further suggests that by capitulating to emotive, non-empirical opposition to full civic
reinstatement, lawmakers run the risk of validating arguments that have no scientific or
logical foundation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States imprisons more of its citizens than any other country in the
world.1 Today, over two million Americans are behind bars and nearly twenty
million bear the mark of a felony conviction. 2 As a result of their convictions,
individuals with a felony criminal history face a host of obstacles. 3 To successfully
* Dr. Binnall is a (self-described) convicted felon who spent over four years in a maximumsecurity prison and almost three years on parole for a DUI homicide that claimed the life of his best
friend. His experiences and research inform this Article.
1. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 196 (2013); Peter
Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE
(June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html [https://perma.cc/G4NF-ZBLL].
2. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html
[https://perma.cc/TK8Q-P22D]; see also Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial
Distribution of People with Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806
(2017); PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2010,
at 1 (Dec. 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7TZ-G7C8].
3. See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences in the American States, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 211,
212 (2012); see also ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES:
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reenter society post-conviction or post-incarceration, those with a criminal record
must learn to overcome such obstacles. 4 To that end, some obstacles are
navigable—temporary encumbrances that will eventually expire or presumptive
disqualifications rebuttable by a showing of successful rehabilitation. 5 Conversely,
other obstacles are insurmountable—categorical restrictions, exclusions, and
prohibitions that are permanent for those unable or unwilling to expend the
substantial effort and financial resources necessary to remove their scarlet letter. 6
Restrictions limiting access to democratic processes are almost always of this
enduring variety.
In recent years, the topic of record-based voter disenfranchisement has
garnered much-deserved attention from academics, policymakers, and the media. 7
Along those lines, a number of jurisdictions have attempted to ease civic
restrictions for those with felony criminal histories—primarily in the area of voting
REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 110 (2008); Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and
Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1213–24 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 665 n.235
(2006); see also Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 26 (Marc Mauer &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
5. See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 80 (2003) (discussing temporary reentry obstacles in the context of supervised release); see
also James M. Binnall, Convicts in Court: Felonious Lawyers Make a Case for Including Convicted Felons in
the Jury Pool, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 1387–93 (2008) (discussing professional-licensure barriers in the
legal profession).
6. In California for instance,
Even attorneys have difficulty mastering and keeping abreast of [the state]’s complex
restoration laws; pro se litigants face a real challenge. The most widely available
California reentry self-help manual, meant for use by non-attorneys, is 1,088 pages
long. Without legal assistance, relief is practically inaccessible for many people. Yet
California does not fund legal services related to reentry and restoration of rights, with
the limited exception of representation in the Certificate of Rehabilitation process.
Some public defender offices and legal service providers offer assistance, but they fall
short of meeting demand. Private attorneys charge fees that are prohibitive for most—
between $500 and $5,000 per petition per case, and up to $10,000 for a pardon.
Eliza Hersh & Gabriel J. Chin, Building a Functional Framework for Reentry and Restoration of Rights:
Lessons from California’s “Mystery House,” 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 283, 286 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
7. See, e.g., PIPPA HOLLOWAY, LIVING IN INFAMY: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT:
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2008); KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS,
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND
MODERN CONSEQUENCES (2d ed. 2013) (providing a detailed overview of research on felon-voter
disenfranchisement); see also Democracy Restoration Act of 2017, S. 1588, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017);
Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting Rights: The Case of
Iowa, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41, 42 (2015); Rebecca Beitsch, Felon Voting Laws Are Confusing. Is It Time to
Ditch Them?, GOVERNING (Apr. 5, 2018, 9:48 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/slfelon-voting-laws-rights-florida-states.html [https://perma.cc/BK4S-8EXX] (detailing the story of
Crystal Mason, a Texas woman sentenced to five years in prison for illegally voting in the 2016
election as a felony probationer); Sandra E. Garcia, Texas Woman Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison for Voter
Fraud
Loses
Bid
for
New
Trial,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/texas-woman-voter-fraud.html
[https://perma.cc/U6MQ-PYH2]; Voting Rights Bill for Felons Signed by Louisiana Governor,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
31,
2018),
https://apnews.com/8d07f26171ee4c6b81f64fe10693980b/Voting-rights-bill-for-felons-signed-byLouisiana-governor [https://perma.cc/CAM3-8PXV].
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disqualifications. 8 While significant and welcomed by members of the systeminvolved community, such efforts are far from comprehensive, often leaving out
citizens with certain types of felony convictions and typically addressing only one
form of civic marginalization. Along with voter disqualifications, record-based
constraints on the opportunity to hold office or sit on a jury make up a class of
civic restrictions that impede participatory democracy. 9 Such restrictions are
particularly insidious, as they strike at the heart of what it means to be a citizen
and are uniquely resistant to legislative reform—in part because they are often
codified in long-standing, petrified statutory provisions. 10
This Article explores the contours of civic restrictions, arguing that while
legislative struggles to restore full citizenship status to those with a felony criminal
history have gained traction in recent years, there is still much more work to be
done. In particular, this Article argues that, when reform is contemplated and
enacted, the civic reinstatement of those with a felonious criminal history is too
often incremental and, at times, arguably ineffectual. Such carve-outs have the
potential to embolden opponents of full civic reinstatement and to hinder reentry.
As a result, democracy continues to move forward without affording those who
are system-involved the opportunity to meaningfully influence its direction.
Along those lines, Part II of this Article reviews the current jurisdictional
landscape of civic restrictions and details the proffered justifications for their
imposition. Part III then chronicles the most recent civic restriction reform
effort—the restoration of voting rights in Florida—noting and questioning the
need to appease opponents of such measures through carve-outs and exceptions.
Part IV briefly notes the danger of legislative compromise in response to illogical,
empirically tenable opposition, noting recent legislation in California addressing
the record-based juror exclusion. Part V discusses the social consequences of
partial reform efforts, arguing that anything less than a full restoration of civic
rights and privileges isolates those most in need of communion and runs the risk

8. See, e.g., Laura Vozella, Virginia Governor McAuliffe Says He Has Broken U.S. Record for Restoring
Voting Rights, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/va-gov-mcauliffe-says-he-has-broken-us-record-for-restoring-votingrights/2017/04/27/55b5591a-2b8b-11e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee_story.html [https://perma.cc/QCH2XEYZ]; see also Dara Kam, Amendment to Restore Felons’ Voting Rights on Florida November Ballot, PALM
BEACH POST (Jan. 24, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/state—regionalgovt—politics/amendment-restore-felons-voting-rights-florida-novemberballot/uXOxe9lET9RE5piKMzZqqK/ [https://perma.cc/R5SU-TCY4]; Kira Lerner, No Longer
‘Voiceless,’ Louisiana Felons Regain the Right to Vote, THINKPROGRESS (June 1, 2018, 1:49 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/no-longer-voiceless-louisiana-felons-regain-the-right-to-votea112f7d12ec9/ [https://perma.cc/DEY7-SE5W]; Vivian Wang, Cuomo Plans to Restore Voting Rights
to
Paroled
Felons,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
18,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/nyregion/felons-pardon-voting-rights-cuomo.html
[https://perma.cc/9G7H-PJCD].
9. See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2003)
(jury service); Andrea Steinacker, Note, The Prisoner’s Campaign: Felony Disenfranchisement Laws and the
Right to Hold Public Office, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (holding office).
10. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 9, at 189 (“The practice of excluding felons from jury service has
both a rich pedigree and a sturdy presence in current law. Felon exclusion has evolved from being a
product of subjective juror qualifications or anti-criminal common-law rules into being a product of
objective statutes. In the process, it has become firmly entrenched and has avoided the general trend
of expanded jury participation.”).
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of short-circuiting criminal desistance mechanisms. Part VI concludes by
suggesting that full restoration of civic rights and privileges for those with felony
criminal histories is sound policy, as it fosters more robust civic debate and
ensures that jurisdictions promote rather than undermine reentry processes.
II. CIVIC RESTRICTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Record-based restrictions on voting, holding office, and jury service are
pervasive. In only one state (Maine) are those with a felony conviction permitted
to cast a vote, appear on a ballot, and serve on a jury. 11 In all other jurisdictions,
a felony criminal conviction triggers restrictions that limit one’s opportunity to
vote, hold office, or serve as a juror. 12
A. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government place
some record-based restriction on voting eligibility. 13 Of those jurisdictions, three
permanently exclude those with a felony conviction from the electorate absent
executive action by the state’s governor. 14 In seventeen states and the District of
Columbia, those with a felonious past are barred from voting while in prison. 15
In twenty states, they are disqualified from voting until the completion of their
sentence, including any period of probation and/or parole. 16 Eleven states impose
some record-based, post-sentence restriction that is contingent upon charge
category and/or a term of years. 17 In the remaining two states, those with a felony
conviction never lose the right to vote and may cast an absentee ballot while
incarcerated. 18
To appear on a ballot as a candidate for public office, those with a felony
conviction again face significant barriers.19 In eight jurisdictions, a felony

11. See James M. Binnall, Felon-Jurors in Vacationland: A Field Study of Transformative Civic
Engagement in Maine, 71 ME. L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2018). Maine does not place any restriction on voting
or jury service. The state ties eligibility to hold office to one’s eligibility to vote. Thus, in Maine, there
are no record-based restrictions placed on those with felony criminal convictions.
12. Id. at 73.
13. JEAN CHUNG, SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 1 tbl.1,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Felony-DisenfranchisementPrimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK6Z-F8LU] (last updated Dec. 2019).
14. Id. at 5 tbl.2 (Iowa, Kentucky, Virginia); see also Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATORS (Oct. 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felonvoting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/T548-PZAA].
15. CHUNG, supra note 13, at 1 tbl.1 (Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah).
16. Id. (Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin).
17. Id. (Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming).
18. Id. (Maine and Vermont).
19. For a comprehensive discussion of record-based candidacy barriers and a jurisdictional
breakdown of candidacy policies current to 2019, see Steinacker, supra note 9, at 804–07.
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conviction categorically prohibits one from holding office. 20 In eleven states, a
citizen with a felony criminal history may serve in office only after a restoration of
civil rights. 21 Three jurisdictions disqualify those with a felony conviction from
public office until the completion of their criminal sentence. 22 Five states impose
a waiting period, whereby a felony conviction will restrict a prospective candidate
for some period of time following a criminal sentence. 23 Seventeen jurisdictions
and the District of Columbia link holding office to voting eligibility, allowing a
citizen convicted of a felony to run for and hold office if he or she is also an
eligible voter. 24 Finally, six states place no record-based restriction on the
opportunity to hold office. 25
As pervasive as record-based restrictions are in the context of voting and
running for office, the exclusion of those with a felony criminal conviction from
jury service is arguably the most pervasive and severe form of civic
marginalization. 26 “Forty-nine states, the federal government, and the District of
Columbia restrict a convicted felon’s opportunity to serve as a juror.” 27 In twentyeight jurisdictions, these restrictions are permanent, banning convicted felons
from jury service for life. 28 “Thirteen states bar convicted felons from jury service
until the full completion of their sentence, notably disqualifying individuals
serving felony parole and felony probation.” 29 Seven states and the District of
Columbia “enforce hybrid regulations that may incorporate penal status, charge
category, type of jury proceeding, and/or a term of years.” 30 And finally, two states
recognize lifetime for-cause challenges, permitting a trial judge to dismiss a
prospective juror from a venire solely on the basis of a felony conviction. 31
B. THE PROFESSED PURPOSES FOR EXCLUSION
The justifications for civic restrictions are premised on the notion that those
20. Id. at 807 (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Pennsylvania; New Hampshire, South
Dakota, West Virginia—for certain election-related or “infamous” felony convictions).
21. Id. at 805 (Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio,
Texas, Utah, Wisconsin).
22. Id. (Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota).
23. Id. at 807 (Georgia, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina).
24. Id. at 806 (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Virginia, Washington, Wyoming).
25. Id. at 804 (Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont).
26. James M. Binnall, Cops and Convicts: An Explanatory Field Study of Jurymandering, 16 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 221, 221 (2018) (“Today, the most prominent [jurymandering] targets . . . Americans with
a felonious criminal history.”).
27. James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support for
Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2014) (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 2, 4 fig.1 (federal, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming).
29. Id. at 4 & fig.1 (Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin).
30. Id. at 4 fig.1, 5 (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon).
31. Id. 4–5 & fig.1 (Illinois and Iowa).
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with criminal histories pose an existential threat to democratic processes. If
allowed to participate fully, so goes the argument, those with felony criminal
convictions would undermine the functionality and integrity of democratic
institutions. 32 No empirical evidence supports these claims. 33 Still, in every U.S.
jurisdiction but one, those with a felony criminal history face restrictions
regarding their opportunity to vote, hold office, or serve as a juror.34
In jurisdictions that exclude those with a felony criminal conviction from the
electorate, supporters of such policies argue that they are necessary to prevent
voter fraud, to stop harmful changes to the law, and to preserve the integrity of
the ballot box. 35 As the Supreme Court of Alabama long ago noted:
The presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or
other base offense indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the
privilege of suffrage . . . upon terms of equality with freemen who are clothed
by the State with the toga of political citizenship. It is proper, therefore, that
this class should be denied a right, the exercise of which might sometimes
hazard the welfare of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least in
close political contests. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a
mere disqualification, imposed for protection, and not for punishment—
withholding an honorable privilege, and not denying a personal right or
attribute of personal liberty.36
Like justifications for voter disenfranchisement, rationales for record-based
restrictions on candidacy suggest that the purpose of exclusion is preventative, not
punitive. Addressing the legality of denying those with a felony conviction the
opportunity to hold public office, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that such
restrictions are akin to professional-licensure requirements that demand a
showing of good character prior to admission; specifically, the court stated:
In our view, [the provision of the Delaware Constitution banning convicted
felons from office] is essentially a character provision, mandating that all
candidates for State office possess high moral qualities. It is not a provision
designed to punish an offender. While conviction of an infamous crime does
not imply than [sic] an offender is incapable of functioning as a respected
and productive member of society, it is irreversible evidence that the
offender does not possess the requisite character for public office. It is
important to emphasize that we are not concerned here with the standard of
compassion which should govern daily interpersonal relationships. We deal,
rather, with a norm established by our Constitution for those who seek to

32. See, e.g., Binnall, Convicts in Court, supra note 5, at 1385–87.
33. For a discussion of empirical analyses of record-based voter disenfranchisement, candidacy
requirements, and juror eligibility, see MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 7, at 136 (voting). See also
Binnall, Felon-Jurors, supra note 11, at 89–92 (jury service); Steinacker, supra note 9, at 813–18
(candidacy).
34. See Binnall, Felon-Jurors, supra note 11, at 72–73.
35. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 7, at 136; Steinacker, supra note 9, at 821–22.
36. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884).
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govern us. Without question, it is a demanding norm.37
The justifications for record-based juror eligibility requirements—like
restrictions on voting and holding public office—are premised on the alleged
threat posed by those with a felony conviction. In particular, jurisdictions that
exclude jury service do so because those with a felony criminal history allegedly
(1) lack character and (2) harbor inherent bias that makes them sympathetic to
criminal defendants and antithetical toward the state. 38
Woven through all of the purported rationales for record-based civic
restrictions is the idea that those who have been convicted of a felony lack the
requisite character to take part in democratic processes—to the point that only
their exclusion will preserve the integrity of such processes. Again, no evidence
supports this claim. Instead, evidence seemingly undermines this assertion.
Tracing back to Stanley Milgram’s electrocution experiments, 39 a wealth of
social-psychological research demonstrates that “character” is largely situational,
undermining the notion that character is a fixed concept. 40 Rather, such research
indicates that character is malleable and alterable, in turn making rehabilitation
possible. 41 Categorical record-based civic restrictions ostensibly ignore this
possibility—disturbingly implicating what criminologist David Garland has called
the “criminology of the other.” 42
The criminology of the other—born in a pre-modern era of crime control—
suggests that those who commit criminal offenses are somehow fundamentally
different than those who have never violated the law or who have not been caught
violating the law.43 By taking the view that system-involved citizens are somehow
distinct boogeymen, the criminology of the other justifies and perpetuates
mistreatment and ostracism under the guise of a rational cost-benefit, risk-threat
analysis. 44
In actuality, it often appears that civic exclusion—part of the vast framework of
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction that ostensibly treats criminal
behavior as an individualized, intrinsic phenomenon—is premised on the desire
to free society from confronting difficult questions about its responsibility for
creating conditions that foster crime and recidivism. In this way, civic restrictions
37. Steinacker, supra note 9, at 822–23 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Wier v. Peterson, 369 A.2d 1076, 1080–81 (Del. 1976)).
38. See Binnall, Felon-Jurors, supra note 11, at 73–74; Kalt, supra note 9, at 73–74.
39. See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371,
371–78 (1963). See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: THE EXPERIMENT
THAT CHALLENGED HUMAN NATURE (1974).
40. See generally, e.g., JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL
BEHAVIOR (2002); Gilbert Harman, No Character or Personality, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 87 (2003); Gilbert
Harman, Skepticism About Character Traits, 13 J. ETHICS 235 (2009).
41. See, e.g., Anders Kaye, Does Situationist Psychology Have Radical Implications for Criminal
Responsibility?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 611, 635–38 (2008).
42. David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary
Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 446 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Simon
Hallsworth, Rethinking the Punitive Turn: Economies of Excess and the Criminology of the Other, 2
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 145, 149–50 (2000).
43. See Garland, supra note 42, at 461; Hallsworth, supra note 42, at 153.
44. Hallsworth, supra note 42, at 153–54.

COPYRIGHT © 2020 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

42

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 73:35

“follow from, rather than explain, a preexisting sense that [those with a felony
conviction] cannot be members of the community.” 45 As one scholar has argued:
None is so repentant a sinner as to share the blame with the criminal. If we
can localize the blame in the individual we can exact vengeance with
precision and satisfaction. The more we can make it appear that all the
causes for delinquency have their origin within the individual victim the
more we may feel self-elation, the less danger there is of negative selffeeling. 46
The justification for civic restrictions based on the idea that those with a felony
criminal history will undermine our democratic processes does not find support
in science. No empirical analysis of record-based restrictions suggests that the
proffered rationales for their imposition are valid. 47 Instead, all studies on civic
restrictions undermine the purported justifications. For this reason, partial
reform measures that reinstate civic opportunities for certain felony convictions
or for certain civic endeavors are problematic, as they ostensibly concede a factual
basis in these justifications—if only for certain populations or in certain contexts.
Such a concession finds no support in research and sets a dangerous precedent
that could be used once again to expand civic restrictions when the political or
social winds dictate, if we are not diligent.
III. FLORIDA: A CASE STUDY OF PARTIAL REFORM
The 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore served
as a flashpoint for the issue of record-based civic restrictions. 48 When the polls
closed in that election, the candidates stood deadlocked, prompting thirty-six days
of recounts.49 In Florida, over 800,000 prospective voters with a felony criminal
conviction had been statutorily denied the right to vote. 50 Since that time, some
scholars have suggested that those disqualified voters would have likely swung the
election in Al Gore’s favor. 51 Though the Supreme Court eventually declared
George W. Bush the victor, 52 the election lay bare the national scar of recordbased civic restrictions and prompted a wealth of research and media attention
45. See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the
Ballot Box,” 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1310 (1989).
46. Id. at 1310–11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WILLIAM T. ROOT, JR., A
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL SURVEY OF 1916 PRISONERS IN THE WESTERN PENITENTIARY
OF PENNSYLVANIA 10 (1927)).
47. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 7, at 136 (voting); Binnall, Felon-Jurors, supra note 11, at
89–92 (jury service); Steinacker, supra note 9, at 813–18 (candidacy).
48. See Thomas E. Mann, Reflections on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Jan. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reflections-on-the-2000-u-spresidential-election/ [https://perma.cc/R52F-VK39].
49. Id.
50. Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 118 n.54
(2004); Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 792 (2002).
51. See Miles, supra note 50, at 86 n.8; Uggen & Manza, supra note 50, at 792; see also MANZA
& UGGEN, supra note 7, at 192.
52. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
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focused on the topic. 53
Along those lines, since 2000, a number of policymakers have moved to reform
voter disenfranchisement laws. For example, in Virginia and New York, executive
measures have restored the right to vote to thousands of citizens with felony
criminal records. 54 In 2018, Louisiana readmitted citizens with a felony criminal
history to the electorate by virtue of legislative action, restoring the right to vote
to thirty-five hundred Louisianans. 55
The most recent effort to restore the vote to those with a felony criminal
conviction came in 2018, in the same state at issue in Bush v. Gore. 56 Florida’s
Voter Restoration Amendment (Amendment 4) appeared on the ballot in
November 2018. 57 That month, Amendment 4 passed with bipartisan support,
restoring voting rights to nearly 1.5 million Floridians with a felony criminal
record. 58 The measure was widely regarded as a monumental step forward in a
state that had traditionally been one of the few remaining jurisdictions to impose
a lifetime record-based voter disenfranchisement provision. 59 Still, the legislation
was far from comprehensive.
Critics of Amendment 4 point out that the measure did not restore voting
rights to citizens convicted of certain felonies, namely those convicted of “murder
or a felony sexual offense.” 60 Moreover, the Amendment requires that to regain
their right to vote, those convicted of a felony must satisfy all terms of an imposed
sentence. 61 In a subsequent legislative pronouncement—Senate Bill 7066 (S.B.
7066)—lawmakers outlined the contours of this requirement. 62 In particular, S.B.
7066 (now codified in the Florida Statutes as § 98.0751) defines completion of a
sentence to mean:
[A]ny portion of a sentence that is contained in the four corners of the
sentencing document, including, but not limited to: . . . Full payment of
restitution ordered to a victim by the court as a part of the sentence. A victim
includes, but is not limited to, a person or persons, the estate or estates
53. See, e.g., HOLLOWAY, supra note 7; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 7; PETTUS, supra note 7;
see also Democracy Restoration Act of 2017, S. 1588, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017); Meredith & Morse,
supra note 7, at 42; Beitsch, supra note 7; Garcia, supra note 7; Kam, supra note 8; Lerner, supra note
8; Voting Rights Bill for Felons Signed by Louisiana Governor, supra note 7; Vozella, supra note 8; Wang,
supra note 8.
54. See Vozella, supra note 8; Wang, supra note 8.
55. See Voting Rights Bill for Felons, supra note 7.
56. See Kam, supra note 8.
57. Id.
58. See Samantha J. Gross, Florida Voters Approve Amendment 4 on Restoring Felons’ Voting Rights,
MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 6, 2018, 9:18 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politicsgovernment/election/article220678880.html.
59. Id.
60. See FLA. DIV. OF ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS FOR THE 2018 GENERAL ELECTION 10 (2018),
https://dos.myflorida.com/media/699824/constitutional-amendments-2018-general-electionenglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB3T-ZMSK].
61. Id.
62. See
S.B.
7066,
2019
Leg.,
121st
Reg.
Sess.
(Fla.
2019),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2019/7066/BillText/er/PDF
[https://perma.cc/J9864LDY].
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thereof, an entity, the state, or the Federal Government[;] [and] . . . Full
payment of fines or fees ordered by the court as a part of the sentence or that
are ordered by the court as a condition of any form of supervision, including,
but not limited to, probation, community control, or parole. 63
Moreover, under S.B. 7066, Florida lawmakers have made it generally
impermissible for a court to “modify[] the financial obligations of an original
sentence.” 64
Though Amendment 4 moved Florida into the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions that do not impose permanent record-based voter disqualifications,
the effort was partial reform in two ways. First, it did not fully restore the vote.
Instead, it excluded certain members of an already marginalized class and added
additional, legislatively constructed burdens to reinstatement. Second,
Amendment 4 does not address record-based candidacy restrictions or permanent
juror exclusion in Florida. In this way, Florida’s Amendment 4, while crucial for
some, leaves out many and hardly addresses the civic inequities in the state.
Unfortunately, where reform efforts are considered, Amendment 4 is the norm,
not an anomaly. 65

63. FLA STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5)(a)–(b) (2020).
64. Id. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5)(d). In October 2019, federal district court Judge Robert Hinkle issued
an injunction blocking Florida from removing seventeen plaintiffs with felony convictions from the
voting rolls. See Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1310–11 (N.D. Fla. 2019). The plaintiffs
sued the State, arguing that they did not have the funds to satisfy their financial obligations to the
State or that the State was unable to accurately assess their fees. See Lawrence Mower, Gov. DeSantis
Appeals Judge’s Order in Amendment 4 Lawsuit, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/11/15/gov-desantis-appeals-judges-order-inamendment-4-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/YK6E-MCK5]. In January 2020, the Florida Supreme
Court issued an advisory opinion as to whether fines and restitution must be paid to satisfy “all
terms” of a criminal sentence as defined in Amendment 4. See Advisory Op. to the Governor Re:
Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 2020)
(per curiam). The court held that unmet financial obligations must be met for “all terms of sentence”
to be satisfied. Id. at 1083 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lawrence Mower, U.S. Judges Cast
Doubt on Florida Law Requiring Ex-Felons to Pay Before They Can Vote, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020, 1:54
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-01-28/florida-felons-voting-poll-tax
[https://perma.cc/5DUE-QS5T]. On January 28, 2020, an Eleventh Circuit panel heard arguments
on the issue. Oral Argument Recordings, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT,
https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings (enter “19-14551” in the “Case Number”
search bar; then click the “Search” button). Attorneys for Governor Ron DeSantis argued in favor of
lifting the injunction ordered by Judge Hinkle, while opposing counsel argued that forcing those with
a felony conviction to satisfy all financial obligations was akin to a modern poll tax. See id. The
Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the preliminary injunction entered by the district court. Jones
v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 832–33 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
65. Relatedly, Louisiana recently considered House Bill 65 (H.B. 65), a bill to restore juror
eligibility to those convicted of a felony criminal offense. Though H.B. 65 would have marked a huge
step forward for Louisiana—currently a permanent exclusion jurisdiction—this bill also suffered from
various carve-outs. Specifically, H.B. 65 did not permit parolees, probationers, or those within five
years of the completion of their sentence to serve. The bill was ultimately voted down in May 2019.
See Bryn Stole, Louisiana Lawmakers Shoot Down Bill to Allow Those with Past Felony Convictions to Serve
on
Juries,
ADVOC.
(May
13,
2019,
6:27
PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_b8d2b852-75d611e9-8f82-bb347152d718.html [https://perma.cc/5XES-XSUT].
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IV. THE COST OF COMPROMISING WITH THE ILLOGICAL
While legislative compromise is essential for effective governance, it comes at a
cost for parties to those negotiations. Still, in the course of policymaking, such
costs are anticipated and accepted. 66 Compromise then, in and of itself, does not
threaten the governing process. Instead, compromise is encouraged and expected
when it is the result of honest, evidence-based negotiation. Unfortunately, in the
case of civic restrictions, such compromise is rarely of this sort.
For example, in California, the state legislature recently took up Senate Bill 310
(S.B. 310), a measure that would restore juror eligibility to those convicted of a
felony criminal offense. 67 As originally drafted, S.B. 310 made all Californians
with a felony criminal history eligible for jury service. 68 If passed in that form, S.B.
310 would have moved California from a permanent exclusion jurisdiction to a
jurisdiction with no record-based restrictions on juror eligibility.
Opponents of S.B. 310—largely comprised of district attorneys and law
enforcement personnel—argued that those with a felony conviction would disrupt
the jury trial process and threaten fellow jurors. 69 In particular, opponents argued
that those on some form of state supervision (probation or parole) should not be
permitted to serve for fear that a supervision violation would disrupt the trial
process. 70 Opponents also contended that those with a felony criminal history
(specifically those with sexual felony offenses) pose a threat to their fellow jurors
and courthouse patrons, such that S.B. 310 would necessitate additional
courtroom security. 71
In the end, S.B. 310 passed both chambers of the California legislature and was
signed into law by Governor Gavin Newsom on October 8, 2019—after a host of
amendments. 72 Those amendments included two notable carve-outs. The first
made felony probationers and parolees ineligible to serve under S.B. 310. 73 The
second preserved California’s permanent exclusion for prospective jurors with a
sexual felony conviction. 74 Though the legislative history of S.B. 310 is silent with
respect to the impetus for the amendments that altered its form, a closer look at
opposition contentions suggests that the changes to S.B. 310 were at least partially
in response to the arguments made by its opponents.
66. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory
Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2007).
67. 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 591 (S.B. 310) (West).
68. See
SB-310
Jury
Service,
CAL.
LEGISLATIVE
INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVersionsCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB31
0&cversion=20190SB31099INT [https://perma.cc/UA5H-BMGS] (comparing the originally
proposed and chaptered versions of the bill).
69. See Video: Assembly Judiciary Committee, Tuesday, June 25th, 2019, CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY
MEDIA
ARCHIVES,
at
3:14:40–3:19:41
(June
25,
2019),
https://www.assembly.ca.gov/media/assembly-judiciary-committee-20190625/video (testimony of
Larry Morris of the California District Attorneys Association and Ryan Sherman of the Riverside
Sheriffs’ Association).
70. Id. (testimony of Larry Morris of the California District Attorneys Association).
71. Id. (testimony of Ryan Sherman of the Riverside Sheriffs’ Association).
72. See 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 591.
73. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 203(a)(10) (West 2020).
74. Id. § 203(a)(11).
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As S.B. 310 illustrates, in the context of civic restrictions, compromise can be
undermining—not because it forces legitimate concessions, which are an integral
part of responsible lawmaking, but because those concessions are most often a
response to arguments based in fearmongering, emotion, and stereotype. In turn,
compromise has the potential to validate opposition that is far from evidence
based. Such compromises belie science and serve to further divide and marginalize
those who must fight to be recognized as full citizens post-felony conviction.
V. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF INCOMPLETE MEASURES
Partially restoring the civic rights and privileges of those with a felony criminal
conviction, either by excluding certain citizens from reform efforts or by failing to
address all civic inequities, also comes with accompanying social costs. First,
incomplete restoration limits, and in some instances eliminates, opportunities for
citizens to fully engage in what Justice Breyer has called “active liberty.” 75 Second,
partial reform can delegitimize the law and make legal compliance less likely. And
finally, for those impacted, incomplete civic reinstatement likely increases the
probability of re-offense by undermining criminal desistance processes.
A. A POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
Political scientists studying the impacts of civic participation have found that
partaking in democratic processes, a holistic endeavor, often fosters more
complete, engaged citizens. 76 For instance, in studies of the effects of jury service,
researchers found that jury service fosters a general sense of empowerment that
frequently leads to other forms of civic engagement. 77 Studies reveal a 4% to 10%
increase in voting rates among former jurors 78 and a positive correlation between
jury service and higher levels of involvement in civic and political activities.79
These effects were most pronounced among those who—like many system-involved
individuals—were less civically engaged prior to jury service. 80 Termed the
“participation effect,” this phenomenon and supporting data tend to show that

75. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 15
(2005) (“[A]ctive liberty . . . refers to a sharing of a nation’s sovereign authority among its people.
Sovereignty involves the legitimacy of a governmental action. And a sharing of sovereign authority
suggests several kinds of connection between that legitimacy and the people.” (emphasis added)).
76. See, e.g., DAVID MATTHEWS, POLITICS FOR PEOPLE: FINDING A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC
VOICE 2 (2d ed. 1999); Mark Button & Kevin Mattson, Deliberative Democracy in Practice: Challenges
and Prospects for Civic Deliberation, 31 POLITY 609, 621 (1999); John Gastil et al., Seeing Is Believing:
The Impact of Jury Service on Attitudes Toward Legal Institutions and the Implications for International Jury
Reform, 48 CT. REV. 124, 128 (2012).
77. See, e.g., John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection Between
Jury Deliberation and Civic Participation, 64 J. POL. 585, 593–94 (2002); John Gastil et al., Jury Service
and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation Hypothesis, 70 J. POL. 351, 363–64 (2008).
78. Gastil et al., Civic Awakening, supra note 77, at 591.
79. Id. at 593; see also JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY
DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 129–53 (2010);
John Gastil & Phil J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Value of
Institutionalized Deliberation, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 605, 608–09 (2006); Gastil et al., Jury Service and
Electoral Participation, supra note 77, at 363–64.
80. Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation, supra note 77, at 363–64.
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civic engagement is often a symbiotic endeavor. 81 In this way, access to one form
of civic engagement makes other forms of engagement more likely, suggesting that
banishment from any civic endeavor may make civic engagement or reengagement
less likely.
When reform efforts overlook certain citizens or other civic restrictions, the
power of the participation effect is lost. For example, one who is able to vote—to
engage fully in the electoral process—may feel a sense of civic empowerment, such
that he or she is moved to run for office or to answer a jury summons. Civic
restrictions can then stunt this enthusiasm, suggesting that a citizen is “good
enough” to vote but not “good enough” to run for office or decide a litigated
matter. In a sense, this dangles full civic reinstatement before categorically
proclaiming one with a felony criminal conviction unfit for other opportunities
afforded “upstanding” members of the community. This can arguably have, at
best, a deleterious effect on enthusiasm and could, at worst, lead to a sense of
hopelessness and re-offense.
B. A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE
Research suggests that citizens’ views of their government are largely a product
of their interactions with that government.82 In particular, procedural justice
research demonstrates that although the outcome of an interaction with a
governmental entity (including the criminal justice system) influences a citizen’s
views and attitudes toward that entity, the significance of an outcome is
marginal. 83 Rather, research suggests that procedures, and in particular the
perceived fairness of those procedures, are the strongest predictors of attitudes
toward governmental entities. 84 Notably, such results appear even in populations
that are facing or have been subject to harsh punishments at the hands of the
state. 85
Perhaps not surprisingly, most citizens describe their contacts with the criminal
justice system as negative. 86 This can lead to high levels of “anticipatory injustice”
in certain communities and among certain populations, 87 leading many citizens

81. Id. at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. See Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 817, 819 (2010) (“In short, citizens learn about their government through their
interactions with it.”).
83. See Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 124 (2000);
Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experiences, 18
L. & SOC’Y REV. 51, 71 (1984).
84. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 157 (1992); see also Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 83, at 124.
85. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 483, 503
(1988).
86. See Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The Experience of African
American Youths, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 532–33 (2006); Claudio G. Vera Sanchez & Ericka B.
Adams, Sacrificed on the Altar of Public Safety: The Policing of Latino and African American Youth, 27 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 322, 332 (2011).
87. See Debra L. Shapiro & Bradley L. Kirkman, Anticipatory Injustice: The Consequences of
Expecting Injustice in the Workplace, in ADVANCES IN ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 152, 156 (Jerald
Greenberg & Russell Cropanzana eds., 2001).

COPYRIGHT © 2020 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

48

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 73:35

to “expect unfair or discriminatory procedures or outcomes.” 88 Importantly, these
negative views typically take on a global quality, as those who endure mistreatment
at the hands of a discrete entity often transfer their negative views to “the system”
or “the government” more generally. 89
For those who bear the mark of a felony criminal conviction, especially for
racial minorities, 90 their prior interactions with state and government entities
assuredly prompt some level of anticipatory injustice. Partial reform measures that
overlook those with certain types of felony convictions or fail to address civic
restrictions in their entirety reinforce already negative views of government and
governing bodies. Importantly, these negative views delegitimize the law and legal
mandates, possibly prompting noncompliance. In this way, because it appears
unfair on a number of levels, partial reform has the potential to denigrate views
of the law and spawn re-offending.
C. A CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Theories of criminal desistance posit that long-term success requires the
cessation of criminal activity (primary criminal desistance), a change in one’s sense
of self (secondary criminal desistance), 91 and full community engagement (tertiary
criminal desistance). 92 When all three phases of the criminal desistance process
occur, success is more probable. 93 Conversely, when criminal desistance processes
are disrupted, the chance of re-offense increases.
Primary criminal desistance occurs when one ceases to engage in criminal
activity. 94 That period of abstention can be of any duration. Secondary criminal
desistance occurs when one undergoes a change in self-concept, prompted by
intrinsic motivations and the construction of a “desistance narrative,” 95 or as the
88. See Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Anticipatory Injustice Among Adolescents: Age and Racial/Ethnic
Differences in Perceived Unfairness of the Justice System, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 207, 208 (2008) (emphasis
omitted).
89. See generally Joe Soss, Making Clients and Citizens: Welfare Policy as a Source of Status, Belief, and
Action, in DESERVING AND ENTITLED: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 291 (Anne L.
Schneider & Helen M. Ingram eds., 2005); Jennifer L. Lawless & Richard L. Fox, Political Participation
of the Urban Poor, 48 SOC. PROBS. 362, 376–77 (2001).
90. Anticipatory injustice often divides along racial lines, as African-American citizens are far
more likely to hold a negative view of the criminal justice system than white citizens are. See Jon
Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of Fairness in the U.S. Criminal
Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 763 (2005).
91. See SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR
LIVES 3–6 (2001) (highlighting how personal identity influences criminal desistance).
92. See Kathryn J. Fox, Civic Commitment: Promoting Desistance Through Community Integration, 18
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 68, 69 (2016); see also Fergus McNeill, Three Aspects of Desistance?,
DISCOVERING
DESISTENCE
(May
23,
2014),
https://discoveringdesistance.home.blog/2014/05/23/three-aspects-of-desistance/
[https://perma.cc/3MN3-UJ8V].
93. See Fox, supra note 92, at 69 (adding that in addition to primary desistance, secondary and
tertiary desistance are “enduring”).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., MARUNA, supra note 91, at 87; see also Sam King, Early Desistance Narratives: A
Qualitative Analysis of Probationers’ Transitions Towards Desistance, 15 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 147, 152
(2013) (“[I]t is the building of a desistance narrative which underpins the development of new
identities.”).
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result of assuming conventional social roles that promote pro-social behaviors and
constrain antisocial behaviors. 96 Tertiary criminal desistance takes place when
system-involved citizens are invited back into their respective communities and
then accept that invitation, such that they are allowed to and subsequently engage
in meaningful civic activities.97 Reforms that are less than a full reinstatement of
civic rights and opportunities threaten the criminal desistance process in three
ways.
First, they make it difficult for those with a felony criminal history to construct
a coherent desistance narrative. When one attempts to rectify a criminal past with
a law-abiding present and future, he or she often struggles to explain to oneself
how it was possible that he or she committed a serious criminal offense “then”
but is “now” focused on pro-social pursuits. In such situations, those with criminal
histories often call on their pasts as a source of wisdom, rewriting a negative past
into a positive present and future. 98 Partial reforms leave civic restrictions in place
to some degree, reminding those with a felony criminal record that they are
perpetually inferior and making construction of a desistance narrative especially
difficult.
Second, partial reforms do not provide all civic opportunities to all those with
felony criminal histories. Hence, these reforms ensure that some, if not all, civic
roles are off limits to those with a felony conviction. This cuts off certain
conventional roles that are likely to promote criminal desistance through
modeling and constraint. Research supports this contention, as studies have
shown that taking on civic roles encourages criminal desistance. 99
Finally, partial reform hinders criminal desistance processes by undermining
full community engagement. Yes, the right to vote brings those with felony
criminal histories into the political process and into contact with their
communities. Nonetheless, when this right is only extended to citizens with a
certain class of felony convictions or in the context of certain civic activities, full
community immersion is impossible. 100 In this way, tertiary criminal desistance
and the social capital it creates are lost, undermining efforts to reenter successfully
96. See, e.g., JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES:
DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70, at 6 (2003); Judith Rumgay, Scripts for Safer Survival: Pathways Out of
Female Crime, 43 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 405, 407–08 (2004). See generally Karen Heimer & Ross L.
Matseuda, Role-Taking, Role Commitment, and Delinquency: A Theory of Differential Social Control, 59 AM.
SOC. REV. 365 (1994).
97. See Fox, supra note 92, at 69 (“[T]ertiary desistance refers to the more cemented state of
desistance that results from a genuine sense of belonging, or integration into a pro-social
community.”).
98. MARUNA, supra note 91, at 98 (“Sometimes the benefits of having experienced crime and
drug use are literal. . . . Ex-offenders say they have learned from their past lives, and this knowledge
has made them wiser people.”).
99. See Christopher Uggen et al., ‘Less than the Average Citizen’: Stigma, Role Transition, and the
Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER
REINTEGRATION 258, 260–286 (Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004) (voting); see also
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 7, at 136 (voting); James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance:
Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on Jury Service, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 22 (2018) (jury service); Bryan
Lee Miller & Joseph F. Spillane, Civil Death: An Examination of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and
Reintegration, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 402, 409 (2012) (voting).
100. See Rachel N. Horan, Restorative Justice: The Relevance of Desistance and Psychology, 14 SAFER
COMMUNITIES 147, 148–50 (2015) (highlighting the importance of community involvement).
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and remain law-abiding.
VI. CONCLUSION
While this Article suggests that partial reforms of civic restrictions are far less
impactful than those that fully reinstate civic rights and privileges to those
convicted of a felony criminal offense, it does not imply that efforts at partial
reform are in vain. Rather, this Article suggests that partial reforms ought to be
viewed and analyzed accurately—as reforms that are better than the status quo but
far less influential than full reform. Along this line, the shortcomings of partial
reforms deserve more attention. Often, reformers must concede carve-outs and
distinctions (such as voting versus jury service) to achieve some measure of
legislative victory. I concede that these victories are hard-fought, but I argue that
we ought not be satisfied and ought to be careful.
Carve-outs and concessions lend credibility to the argument that those with a
felony criminal history somehow threaten our democratic systems and likely
undermine reentry processes—though no data support selective exclusion
premised on crime type and no evidence justifies exclusion from one form of civic
engagement over another. In short, we have many more battles to come on this
front, and we should pledge to fight those battles with facts and science,
compromising only in the face of legitimate, evidence-based counterpoints. To do
anything less diminishes the importance of full civic reinstatement—the only
resolution that will ensure that millions of Americans who live with a felony
conviction—myself included—can truly influence the future of our country.

